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The form of development which particularly pre-
dominates in the largest countries of the region has 
been repeatedly criticized in various CEPAL stu-
dies because of its tendency towards a concentrated 
distribution of income, the persistence of extreme 
poverty, incapacity to absorb the entire labour force 
in a productive manner, growing external vulnerabi-
lity, and increasing loss of national capacity to ma-
nage the economy, 
T h e author accepts the critical appraisal of this 
form of development, and alter describing its broad 
features he seeks to identify the role which transna-
tional corporations have played and are still playing 
in its conformation. According to his main hypothe-
sis, there is a contradiction between the transnatio-
nal objectives of these enterprises and the national 
objectives aimed at securing an integrative and au-
tonomous style of development. 
This fundamental contradiction is manifested at 
both the internal and external levels. At the internal 
level, it is expressed in particular through the orien-
tation of the structure of production, which is adap-
ted to the restrictive and elitist demand of the strata 
with the highest income, while at the external level 
it is reflected in the incapacity of the transnational 
corporations to solve the problems of the external 
bottleneck, which they may even help to make wor-
se, and in their real and potential role with regard to 
the regional integration processes. 
Finally, the author concludes that the region 
could enjoy strong bargaining power vis-à-vis the 
transnational corporations on the basis of its present 
level of development and productive potential, and 
if this power were used wisely and energetically, it 
would enable the countries to ensure that the parti-
cipation of the transnational corporations was in 
keeping with national interests. 
•Staff member of the CEPAL/CTC Joint Unit on transna-
tional Corporations. 
Introduction* 
It is important to make some cautionary obser-
vations at the very beginning about the analysis 
presented in this document. 
The first observation is that the approach 
adopted in the analysis seeks to treat Latin 
America as a whole without, however, over-
looking fundamental national differences. The 
statements made below are .therefore not valid 
for a particular country, or at least were not 
intended in this way. Clearly, when dealing 
with a particular national case there are much 
greater possibilities of action and a broad range 
of variables comes into the reckoning, which is 
not the case when dealing with the entire re-
gion. A strategy which may be viable for a parti-
cular national case in a particular regional and 
world situation may be quite unfeasible for the 
region as a whole. 
The second observation consists of the re-
cognition that the analysis does display a cer-
tain bias towards the large countries of the re-
gion. This is because these countries constitute 
outstanding cases of penetration by the trans-
national corporations and because their pre-
sent economic dilemma is closer to the limits 
which could be reached if the present form of 
development is maintained in the future. 
Finally, throughout the document referen-
ces will be made to the serious problems raised 
by the present form of development of the re-
gion and hypotheses will be proposed regard-
ing the possibilities of a new pattern of re-
source allocation. In order to deal with this set 
of problems, an analysis should be made of the 
action of the State, public enterprises, national 
capitalism, and the transnational corporations, 
bringing out the various combinations of inter-
ests among them. In fact, however, the docu-
ment concentrates its attention on the transna-
tional corporations, without going into a more 
*This study forms part of a more general scheme and is 
complemented by the study by Arturo Núñez del Prado, 
"The transnational corporation in a new planning process", 
also publ ished in this issue of CEPAL Review. 
An earlier version of this article was presented at the 
Seminar on Restrictive Trade Practices sponsored by 
UNCTAD in June 1980. The author wishes to thank Nor-
berto González, Arturo Núñez del Prado, Pedro Sáinz and 
Adolfo Gurrieri, whose observations and comments per-
mitted significant improvements to be made to this work. 
I t goes without saying, of course, that this does not commit 
them in any way to the views expressed in this article. 
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detailed analysis of the role of the 'internal' 
agents of development. In other words, it gives 
special treatment to one of the manifestations of 
exclusive, concentrating and vulnerable devel-
opment. This does not mean, however, that it 
overlooks the fact that the phenomena of trans-
nationalization take place through internal 
power structures which are penetrated by it or 
that the correct analytical approach calls for 
consideration of the State, national capitalism 
and the transnational corporations as co-promo-
ters of the present pattern of development and 
jointly responsible for its maintenance or su-
persession. 
Contradictions of the present form of development 
According to the concept which lies at the base 
of this study, the present form of growth in the 
region —based on restrictive industrializa-
tion— is now at the crossroads, at both the in-
ternal and external levels, and this fact is bound 
to bring about the restructuring of the dynamic 
factors of growth for the future, whatever the 
particular visions of the various power groups. 
There are many studies and an increasing-
ly broad consensus which indicate that the pre-
sent style of development of Latin America 
(and particularly of the countries which have 
gone farthest in the process of industrializa-
tion) will not be capable of solving the serious 
problems with which it is currently faced. 
This type of development, which is concentra-
ting, exclusive and vulnerable at the external 
level, as indicated so many times by CEPAL 
and various Latin American authors, will not be 
changed simply by pursuing the goal of eco-
nomic growth nor through the 'sovereign' ac-
tion of the market forces. 
Thus, a redefinition of the present style of 
development is necessary, and this will cer-
tainly pass through levels of political decision-
making which will have to take into account the 
needs or demands of substantial masses of the 
national population which have so far been 
marginated in one way or another from enjoy-
ment of the benefits of the previous kind of 
growth. 
It can be expected, however, that this res-
tructuring of national objectives and commit-
ments will come into conflict with the present 
interests of internal power groups and with the 
form of operation of the transnational corpora-
tions in the region. 
It is clearly necessary to recognize the fra-
gility of the distinction between internal and 
external factors in a 'transnationalizing' form of 
development, in which both aspects necessari-
ly merge. Nevertheless, in the present article 
an attempt is made to state some considerations 
regarding the specific role of the transnational 
corporations in the present style and in its pos-
sible reformulation. 
Of course it must be acknowledged that in 
order to produce a wide range of goods which 
are of vital importance for their development, 
the countries of the region need the support of 
the transnational corporations. The needs for 
technology, for increasing productivity on the 
basis of new inventions, or for penetration into 
the markets of the central countries are only 
some of the aspects in which it is clearly seen to 
be in the region's interest to have the support of 
such corporations. 
The idea that 'what is good for General 
Motors is good for the rest of the [capitalist] 
world', however belongs to the past, or else 
survives only among diehard neoclassical 
economists. 
It is obvious today that the motives of the 
transnational corporations do not necessarily 
coincide with the most representative national 
interests, and that their action at the world level 
may be a factor in the frustration or condition-
ing of the objectives of the countries them-
selves. 
The present article proposes to analyse 
this contradiction at the present stage of growth 
of the region and to weigh it in relation to the 
possibilities that this growth could take new 
courses. 
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II 
The challenge to development1 
1. The production potential 
The process of industrialization of Latin Ame-
rica is today a reality and in the evaluation of 
our material possibilities it is of vital impor-
tance to understand this. Over the period 1950-
1975, the region's product more than quadru-
pled, reaching a level higher than that of Eu-
rope in 1950, when the latter region was already 
one of the most industrialized areas and in-
cluded some of the main world economic pow-
ers among its member countries. Over the same 
period, the production of machinery and 
equipment in Latin America has increased 
ninefold to cover three-quarters of the region's 
needs; the production of steel has increased 
more than 13 times, that of cement has in-
creased sevenfold, the amount of electrical 
energy generated in 1975 was more than eight 
times that generated in 1950, and automobile 
production —which did not even exist in 
1950— amounted in 1975 to almost two million 
units. 
Over the same period, the share of the 
manufacturing sector in the total product of 
the most industrialized countries of the re-
gion has reached percentages comparable 
with those of the United States economy. 
These facts, and other well-known items of 
a similar nature, reflect the development of the 
forms of production in Latin America, and the 
picture can be heightened by some projections 
into the future. Thus, according to CEPAL cal-
culations,2 some significant changes may be 
glimpsed ahead. In order to understand this 
better, they will be presented in comparison 
with particular aspects of the situation of the 
European Economic Community in 1970. 
iThis section is based on the addresses delivered by 
the Executive Secretary of CEPAL, Mr. Enrique V. Igle-
sias, at recent sessions of CEPAL. See CEPAL Review, No. 
3, first half of 1977, and No. 9, December 1979. 
2 See CEPAL, Long-term trends and prospects of the 
development of Latin America, E/CEPAL/1076, April, 
1979. 
—The domestic product of Latin America 
in 1990 will come to a little over US$ 450 bil-
lion: i.e., it will be only slightly below that of 
the EEC in 1970, which was US$ 500 billion in 
round figures.3 
—The Latin American manufacturing 
product is expected to amount to some US$ 135 
billion, which is only 20% less than that of the 
EECinl970. 4 
—The supply of electrical energy in 1990 
will be very close to 800 billion KWH: much 
more than the supply of the EEC in 1970, 
which was 606 billion KWH.S 
—The gross value of the production of 
machinery and equipment in 1990 is expected 
to amount to some US$ 138 billion, which is 
more than the figure recorded in 1970 for the 
EEC (US$126 billion).6 
Of course these comparisons could be sub-
ject to many reservations, but they are useful 
for bringing out the big changes which have 
taken place in the size and composition of the 
regional economic system. 
Although these results are undoubtedly 
impressive as regards material possibilities, 
however, they cannot serve to conceal some 
criticisms and reservations regarding various 
problems of fundamental importance. On the 
contrary, in emphasizing the size and nature of 
the region's production potential what is 
sought is not to give rise to complacent satisfac-
tion, but rather to arouse reflection. 
In this respect, it must be acknowledged 
that a number of the region's problems have got 
3 In 1970 dollars, as in all the other estimates. A growth 
rate of 6 .1% per year has been assumed: i.e., that actually 
achieved between 1970 and 1975. 
4 The industrial growth rate assumed is 7.1% per year, 
which is the actual average for the period 1970-1975. 
5
 Assumed growth rate of 8.7% per year, observed on 
average during the period 1950-1975. 
6 T h e growth rate for the period 1950-1974 was of the 
order of 11.2% per year on average, and the projection 
assumes that this will remain constant for the period 1974-
1990. 
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worse. The social distribution of the fruits of 
the expansion of production has remained 
unaltered and in some cases has even deterio-
rated; new and more complex forms of depen-
dence with respect to the exterior have devel-
oped, and the political system has not evolved 
in the direction of greater representativity. 
Moreover, these are only a few of the most 
delicate problems. 
2, Extreme poverty 
The first of these problems is to satisfy the 
essential needs of the great masses who have 
not had access to the fruits of development in 
recent decades: that is to say, to afford substan-
tial relief from the extreme poverty in which a 
considerable proportion of the population of 
Latin America is still living, or else eliminate 
such poverty altogether within a reasonable 
time. 
The magnitude of such extreme poverty in 
the region is reflected in some recent estimates 
made by CEPAL, according to which in 1972 
around 40% of the population of Latin America 
(i.e., over 110 million people) were living in 
conditions of'absolute poverty', and 54 million 
of them could be considered as 'indigent',7 
It is worth looking at some world-level fi-
gures regarding this problem in order to get a 
better idea of the particular situation of Latin 
America. 
The World Bank has published some esti-
mates on the investments needed in order to 
secure a substantial improvement within one 
decade of the situation of the 750 million per-
sons in the world who at present have a per 
capita income of less than 200 dollars per year, 
which is considered to amount to a situation of 
extreme poverty. The investments required in 
this period are calculated to be between US$ 
110 and 125 billion, or between US$ 11 and 13 
billion per year over one decade. This figure 
may be compared with world spending on 
7 See CEPAL, The economic and social development 
and external economic relations of Latin America, E/ 
CEPAL/1061 and Add. 1, February 1979, Vol. I, pp . 148 et 
seq. 
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arms, which amounted in a single year (1975) to 
some US$ 300 billion. Many other comparisons 
could be made: with the total product of the 
developed countries, with the present amount 
of investments or spending on certain items 
which are consumed on a massive scale but are 
not essential, etc. In all cases it may be con-
cluded that while the investment required is 
considerable it is nevertheless within the 
bounds of possibility and is not Utopian. In 
other words, from the point of view of the devel-
opment of its productive forces, human society 
as a whole —without considering divisions be-
tween nations and classes— seems to be poten-
tially in a position to cross the threshold of what 
has been called the realm of necessity. In a 
region like Latin America, whose production 
potential and per capita income are consider-
ably higher than in Asia or Africa, this assertion 
has of course a much firmer basis. 
The conclusions of a study carried out in 
CEPAL serve to corroborate this thesis.9 If the 
historical growth rate of around 6% per year 
were maintained, the poorer half of the region's 
population could arrive at the position of satis-
fying their basic needs as regards food and 
clothing within one decade provided that their 
share of total income rose from approximately 
14% to 20% either through an increase in their 
income, social allowances for their benefit, or a 
combination of both factors. For this to take 
place it would be sufficient for the share of 
income corresponding to the 10% of the popu-
lation with the highest income to be reduced 
from 44% to 41% and for that of the inter-
mediate strata to be reduced from 42% to 39%. 
It should be borne in mind that this would not 
prevent the absolute incomes of these groups 
from continuing to rise during this period (the 
income of the richest 10% would increase from 
US$ 1 945 in 1970 to US$ 2 424 in 1980, mea-
sured in 1970 dollars). 
Perhaps these calculations could be ac-
cused of being a little ingenuous, but they un-
doubtedly serve to show that the elimination of 
critical poverty in the region is within the 
realms of the possible, 
8 S e e Aníbal Pinto, "Styles of development in Latin 
America", CEPAL Review, No. 1, first half of 1976. 
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3. Income distribution, population growth 
and employment oj the labour force 
In contrast with this real and concrete possibil-
ity, the available figures for 1960 and 1970 
reveal that in the course of this decade there 
was no significant change in income distribu-
tion. In both these years the poorer half of the 
population received around 14% of the income, 
the following 20% received a similar amount, 
and the top 30% received the remaining 72%. 
In other words, to judge from the average fig-
ures, income distribution remained unaltered 
after a decade of development in Latin Ameri-
ca. It may be, however, that in this case the 
averages do not express the whole magnitude 
of the situation. During this period, some of the 
countries of greatest relative development and 
fastest growth actually witnessed the aggrava-
tion of the problem of income concentration. 
Thus, in Brazil the relative share of total 
income received by the poorest 40% went 
down from 10.5% in 1960 to 7.1% in 1970, while 
in Mexico the same stratum of the population 
saw its share go down from 14.3% in 1950 to 
11.6% in 1970. 
In close connexion with the reality of the 
aggravation of income concentration, it is nec-
essary to consider the challenges and problems 
deriving from the growth of the population as a 
whole and of the labour force; some CEPAL 
studies have estimated the probable trends of 
these indicators for the coming decades. 
As this is rather a controversial matter it 
does not seem desirable to go into detail on the 
more hotly contested points of view, but we 
should keep clear in our minds an objective 
reality which is not affected by this. Whatever 
the future population growth policies followed 
in Latin America, the total number of inhabit-
ants in the region will continue increasing 
rapidly until the end of the century and even 
beyond then. 
Even if we assume a drastic fall in the 
growth of the population —if we assume, for 
example, that between 1970 and the end of the 
century this growth rate will go down by half 
(from 2.8% to 1.4%)— the number of inhabit-
ants in the year 2000 would nevertheless be 
close on 500 million, while if the present 
growth rate is maintained (a hypothesis which 
is not very likely in view of this rate's natural 
downward trend), the total population would 
exceed 600 million in the year 2000. 
Whatever the final situation, it is certain 
that the future evolution of these indicators will 
to some extent bring into question the current 
views of those who maintain that Latin America 
is an underpopulated region with abundant 
resources in comparison to its population. 
The prospects are even more striking as 
regards the labour force. For various reasons 
—high rates of growth in past decades and the 
age structure of the population—the number of 
persons seeking work will increase by about 
3 % per year for several decades. In this case, it 
should be noted, the differences between 
countries are smaller than in the case of the 
population growth rate. The estimates made, 
which cover a large part of the region (20 coun-
tries), indicate that the number of economically 
active persons will increase from some 99 mil-
lion in 1975 to some 200 million by the year 
2000. 
Obviously, these facts will considerably 
heighten the existing serious problems of un-
employment. A specialized body of ILO —the 
Regional Employment Programme for Latin 
America and the Caribbean (PREALC)— esti-
mates that, for a group of countries of the region 
(Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico 
and Venezuela) whose population makes up 
around 75% of the total for Latin America, 
under-utilization of labour around 1970, taking 
account of both open unemployment and 
under-employment in both agriculture and 
non-agricultural sectors, was equivalent to 28% 
of the labour force. In other words, out of every 
four economically active persons, one is not 
taking proper advantage of his productive 
potential. 
14 CEPAL REVIEW No. 14 / August 1981 
III 
The problems of development and the presence 
of the transnational corporations 
1. The present style. 
In the face of the large figures mentioned 
above, the traditional reaction is to put forward 
the economistic reasoning that the region 
should speed up the growth rate of its product, 
for which purpose it is a prime necessity to 
raise the rate of investment. It should be noted, 
however, that the problems specific to the 
present style of development in the region, 
particularly in the countries of greatest eco-
nomic potential, will not be solved exclusively 
through growth, even assuming that this reach-
ed unrealistically high rates. The problem is 
not just that of the need to grow, although this is 
the essential starting point: what it is absolute-
ly essential to know is how to grow and, above 
all, to have a clear idea of" who the growth is 
intended for. 
The continuation of the present form of 
growth, based on the dynamism of the demand 
of the upper and medium income levels and the 
transplantation of" the consumption patterns of 
the central economies, will not be capable of 
doing away with this style of'misguided devel-
opment' which excludes great masses of the 
population, concentrates wealth, and increases 
vulnerability at the external level: indeed, it 
may rather be said that it will tend to confirm 
this style. 
It has been said that the consumer society 
in Latin America is incompatible with the erad-
ication of the type of society where consump-
tion is at an unacceptably low level.9 In this 
connexion, in order to take up the challenge of 
eliminating extreme poverty and offering work 
opportunities to the economically active popu-
lation it is necessary to redefine the present 
allocation of resources, reorienting the dyna-
y See in this connexion the latest studies by Raúl 
Prebisch, "A critique of peripheral capitalism", CEPAL 
Review, No. 1, first half of 1976, and "Towards a theory of 
change" , CEPAL Review, No. 10, April 1980. 
mism of the economic systems towards the 
sectors and activities responsible for basic and 
generalized items of consumption. 
Obviously, it is necessary to bear in mind 
the difficulties and pitfalls which will stand in 
the way of any attempt to redefine the present 
pattern of development. Such an attempt 
would naturally come into conflict with the 
vested interests of the sectors of greater relative 
dynamism, which are heavily committed to 
'elitist' consumption. As regards one of the 
main agents of this type of society, it could be 
expected that the redefined national objectives 
would call for a redefinition of the form of 
operation of transnational corporations and 
their relations with the countries. 
The transnational corporations in Latin 
America are located, as is well known, mainly 
in the countries with bigger markets which 
have advanced furthest towards the consumer 
society, and within them, in the most dynamic 
sectors of that type of society. In a recent 
CEPAL study it was observed that in 1973 21% 
of the branches of 7 500 transnational corpora-
tions in Latin America were located in Brazil, 
19% in Mexico and 12% in Argentina.10 In the 
case of Brazil, out of the 2 800 largest manufac-
turing enterprises, in 1975 foreign enterprises 
had a particularly high share in total sales of 
' transport equipment (76%), engineering prod-
ucts (71%), machines and accessories, includ-
ing electrical machines (67%), rubber products 
(66%) and chemical products (62%).ll In the 
case of Mexico, it was noted in 1970 that 40% of 
the industrial production corresponded to 
transnational corporations: 35% of the produc-
tion of non-durable consumer goods, 30% of 
intermediate goods, 62% of durable consumer 
10A. E. Calcagno, "Informe sobre las inversiones direc-
tas extranjeras en América Latina", CEPAL Cuadernos 
Seríes, Santiago, Chile, No. 33,1980, pp. 39 et seq. 
^ C E P A L , The economic and social development..., 
op. cit., Vol. II, p. 183. 
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goods, and 36% of capital goods.12 In Argentina, 
an analysis of foreign investment in the indus-
trial sector reveals that in 1972 3 1 % of the total 
manufacturing production of the country cor-
responded to foreign enterprises.13 
In reality, it does not seem necessary to go 
any further into statistics on matters which are 
well known to all. The transnational corpora-
tions in Latin America grow, and together with 
other forces they promote a type of develop-
men t which is of an imitative consumer nature, 
bu t unlike what happens in the centres this 
development is exclusive and vulnerable. In 
this respect, any conscious attempt to change 
the present allocation of resources will have to 
overcome not only the resistance of domestic 
power groups, but also the opposition of the 
transnational corporations. 
At this point it seems worth recalling the 
words of Raúl Prebisch: "Let us blame the 
transnational corporations for what we will, but 
let us not forget that the main responsibility for 
the great and growing inequalities in the distri-
but ion of income is not borne by external 
forces. These inequalities are the results of the 
internal economic, social and political forces of 
development . The transnational corporations 
have great importance, but the main role cor-
responds to the countries. The transnational 
corporations cannot by their own efforts change 
the economic system and the pattern ol con-
sumption. This depends on decisions of gov-
ernments in their development plans".14 
However, it is not only ethical considera-
tions —although these are more than suf-
ficient— which oblige us to consider changing 
the style of development of Latin America: 
there are also crucial economic issues related 
with the current problems of the external sector 
and the possibility oí reorganizing the dynamic 
forces for future development. 
1 2 F. Kajnzylber, "Las empresas transnacionales y el 
sistema industrial de México", El Trimestre Económico, 
Mexico City, October-December 1975. 
13A. E. Calcagno, op. cit., p. 45. 
1 4Statements made by Raúl Prebisch at the Meeting of 
High-Level Personalities commissioned by the United Na-
tions to study the phenomenon of transnational corpora-
tions, quoted in J. Kñakal, "Las empresas transnacionales 
en el desarrollo contemporáneo de América Latina", 
ILPES, Santiago, 1979, p . 37. 
2. The problems of development and the ex-
ternal sector: the need to import 
The external projection of the present style of 
development in Latin America displays prob-
lems which have been becoming more acute, 
and for which it is difficult to see how any 
solution can be found without having recourse 
to decisive and intelligent action in the direc-
tion of a change in the growth model. 
It is well known that the process of indus-
trialization in Latin America started with the 
simplest activities and progressed to those 
which are more complex from the point of view 
of technology and organization. In the course of 
this process, great horizontal diversification 
was achieved but this was not accompanied by 
an equivalent degree of vertical integration and 
inter-sectoral complementation. The branches 
ofgreatest technological complexity and also of 
greatest dynamism thus remained somewhat 
behind, particularly in the case of those 
producing certain basic inputs, such as 
chemical and metallurgical products, and those 
producing a wide variety of capital goods. It 
will readily be understood that if the style of 
development is based on a form of industrial-
ization which imitates that of the centres, and if 
the consumption of goods of great technologi-
cal complexity becomes generalized in the 
strata with the highest incomes, then there will 
necessarily be a rapid increase in the need for 
imports in order to make good the lack of 
vertical integration and compensate for the 
absence of inter-sectoral complementation. In 
this respect, a CEPAL study stated: 
"Up to 1965, the average growth of imports 
was 0.4 times that of the product: in other 
words, an annual growth of 6% in the product 
was accompanied by a growth of 2.4% in 
imports. In the period from 1965 to 1973, 
however, the relationship between the two 
growth rates came to be an average of 1.3, so 
that the same 6% annual growth rate in the 
product was now accompanied by an increase 
of 7.8% in imports". Going further into this 
point, the same study stated: "There is another 
fact which aggravates the situation still further: 
the coefficient of elasticity of total imports with 
respect to the product increases in relation to 
the growth rate. In other words, not only is the 
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coefficient of* elasticity greater than unity, so 
that imports tend to grow more rapidly than the 
product, but furthermore, this situation 
becomes more serious in proportion as the 
growth rate accelerates, since the coefficient of 
elasticity itself also increases".15 
In addition to the increase in the need for 
imports, there was also a change in their com-
position which reduced still further the field of 
action of conventional economic policy. Thus, 
be tween 1960 and 1975 the share of capital 
goods in total imports rose from 20% to 23%, 
that of basic inputs from 34.7% to 39.4%, and 
that of fuels from 8.7% to* 14.1%.16 The in-
creasing rigidity of the import pattern with the 
present style of development means that any 
reduction in imports naturally has an adverse 
effect on the level of economic activity and, 
above all, on the rate of formation of capital and 
growth, thus threatening the very possibility of 
the survival of the style of development. 
Clearly, there are various eonjunctural 
causes which could explain this behaviour of 
the external sector,17 but there can be no doubt 
that the structural background is linked with 
the existence of very dynamic consumption 
patterns derived from the concentration of 
income. In proportion as income increases in 
our countries, the intermediate and upper 
sectors, whose weight is decisive in effective 
demand, satisfy their simpler demands com-
pletely and go on to create a type of demand 
which is concentrated preferentially on more 
complex goods, largely originating abroad, or 
else requir ing a high imported content if 
produced in the country. 
As the counterpart to this, the structure of 
industrial supply evolves towards a type of dy-
namic industry with a high propensity to im-
15This behaviour is even more unfavourable in some 
countries of the region. Thus, in Brazil between 1965 and 
1973 imports grew almost twice as fastas the product, while 
in Argentina, from 1966 to 1972, the rate of growth of im-
ports was approximately 1,8 times that of the product. See 
CEPAL, Integración económica u sustitución de importa-
ciones en América Latina, by Juan Ayza, Gérard Fichet and 
Norberto González, Mexico City, Fondo de Cultura Econó-
mica, 1975, p . 13 and pp. 52 et seq. 
" 'CEPAL, Statistical Yearbook for Latin America, 
1978. 
17Siieh as overvaluation of the exchange rate, stacken-
ing of action to contain imports from outside Latin America, 
increased facilities for external financing, etc. 
port, in which the transnational corporations 
predominate. 
It is worth stopping here to consider the 
significance of foreign ownership of the indus-
tries of greatest relative dynamism and its ef-
fects on the external sector imbalances. It is 
important to note right away that the demand 
for imports displayed by branches of transna-
tional corporations does not always seem to be 
in keeping with the technical requirements for 
imported content of the type of goods they are 
producing. The conclusion might be reached 
that a percentage of the imports exceeds the 
real needs and thus makes up a sort of 'propen-
sity to import' which favours the global and 
profit-making interests of the world enterprise. 
As will readily be understood, this occurs in 
addition to the dependence on imports impo-
sed by the style of development itself, thus 
aggravating the situation of external sector im-
balance. 
In Mexico, it has been observed that the 
imports of foreign industrial enterprises make 
up almost half of the imports of capital goods by 
the private sector, and as this percentage is 
greater than the actual share of these enterpri-
ses in industrial production, it may be conclu-
ded that their import coefficient is higher. Ac-
cording to an estimate of imports of intermedi-
ate goods, the import coefficient (imports of 
intermediate goods/gross value of production) 
is 7.8% for the transnational corporations and 
3.4% for the national firms, while for imports as 
a whole this coefficient (total imports/gross val-
ue of production) was 11.9% in 1970 for the 
transnational corporations and 5.1% for all in-
dustries taken together. Moreover, it is impor-
tant to note that the attitude of the-transnational 
corporations with regard to exports is usually 
not very dynamic. Consequently, the transna-
tional sector of the economy displays recurrent 
trade deficits: in the period 1970-1973 the aver-
age trade deficit of the transnational corpora-
tions was 47% of the total trade deficit of the 
Mexican economy.18 
In the case of Colombia, the position in 
1 8See Fernando Fajnzylber and Trinidad Martínez Ta-
rrago, Las empresas transnacionales. Expansión a nivel 
mundial y proyección en la industria, Mexico City, 1975, 
pp. 520 et seq. 
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1971 was that 93.5% of the imports of industrial 
enterprises corresponded to enterprises where 
there was more than 49% of foreign capital. 
Moreover, the balance between exports and 
imports of industrial enterprises in which there 
was foreign capital showed a heavy deficit of 
US$ 196.2 million, which may be compared 
with the total trade deficit of the country, 
amount ing to US$ 192.3 million.19 
In reality, the crucial problem is that this 
tendency of the transnational enterprises to im-
port is frequently linked with a reluctance to 
export, thus giving rise to heavy external trade 
deficits. It must be understood that this study 
does-not pretend to criticize in itself the fact 
that the imports of the transnationalized sectors 
are of greater relative weight, when this can be 
explained by reasons of location in the produc-
tive structure, type of goods produced, etc. 
What this study does wish to stress is that fre-
quently these imports do not strictly corres-
pond to those needs on the one hand, while on 
the other the reluctance of the transnational 
corporations with regard to exports, as we shall 
see below, means that the weight of these im-
ports adversely affects the external sector posi-
tion of the countries. Thus, a recent study ca-
rried out in Chile shows that in 1979 the trade 
balance of the total number of transnational 
corporations operating in the country gave a 
deficit of US$ 234 million, which goes up to 
US$ 334 million if the mining enterprises are 
excluded: this figure represents 38% of the to-
tal Chilean trade deficit.20 
Comparisons between transnational cor-
porations and national enterprises, not adjus-
ted by scale, indicate that the former import 
more than twice as much as the latter, regard-
less of whether the measurement is between 
imported and domestic inputs or between im-
ports and production. If a sample designed to 
take scale into account is included for the va-
rious industrial sectors, the difference is also 
systematically in the same direction, although 
smaller: imports represented 20% of the total 
costs of domestic industrial enterprises and 
1 9See A.E. Calcagno, op. cit., p. 54. 
2 0 See E. Lahera, La presencia de las empresas trans-
nacionales en Chile, CEPAL/CTC Joint Unit on Transna-
tional Corporations, E/CEPAL/R. 235,1980. 
24% of the costs of comparable transnational 
industrial enterprises in Chile in 1978.21 This 
shows that even in conditions of greater compa-
rability the transnational corporations tend to 
import more than domestic enterprises. 
From another viewpoint, it is important to 
observe that a high percentage of the imports of 
transnational corporations are carried out in ac-
cordance with an 'entrepreneurial rationale' 
which only fits in with the interests of the world 
enterprise, by means of operations carried out 
within the same firm between its various bran-
ches or associate enterprises. 
Table 1 shows that in certain industrial 
branches in the modern sector in the Mexican 
and Brazilian economies —two outstanding ca-
ses of penetration by transnational corporations 
in the generation of consumer societies— the 
percentages of 'captive imports' of raw mate-
rials carried out by branches from their own 
United States transnational parent firms amoun-
ted in 1972 to an average of almost 58% of 
total imports of such goods in the first case and 
almost 50% in the second.22 
The preference of transnational corpora-
tions for importing through intra-firm opera-
tions is even more marked if we consider the 
amount of their imports from the home country 
of their parent firm. Thus, for example, imports 
from the United States, Germany and Japan by 
branches of transnational corporations of those 
countries installed in Mexico represented 74%, 
8 1 % and 94% respectively of the total imports 
of such branches in 1972.23 
Furthermore, as regards imports of capital 
goods by branches of transnational corpora-
tions through operations within the same firm, 
in the case of Brazil it was observed that there 
was a substitution of current or potential im-
2 1 These data are the result of research currently being 
carried out by Ismael Cárdenas in the CEPAL/CTC Joint 
Unit on Transnational Corporations. See E. Lahera, Agen-
tes del comercio exterior en América Latina, CEPAL, pre-
liminary version (typescript). 
2 2Foreign investments from branches of United States 
firms in Brazil represented 30.4% of total foreign invest-
ments in 1977, while in Mexico they represented 72.2% of 
such investments in 1975. See A.E. Calcagno, op. cit., pp. 
41 et seq. 
2 3 See F. Fajnzylber, Las empresas trans nació nales. 
Expansión a nivel mundial y proyección en la industria 
mexicana, CONACYT-CIDE, Mexico, 1975. 
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Table 1 
BRAZIL AND MEXICO: SOURCES OF INPUTS IMPORTED BY BRANCHES 








Total imports of inputs 



























Source: United States Senate Committee on Foreign Relations, Subcommittee on Multinational Corporations, Multi-
national Corporations in Brazil and Mexico: Structural Sources of Economic and Non-economic Power, United 
States Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., August 1975. 
"Excluding the rubber industry. 
ports (in short-term 'consumption' and long-
term production) with opposite signs, in the 
sense that these operations favoured the de-
mand for imports to the detriment of possible 
domestic production.24 That is to say, transna-
tional corporations not only have a propensity 
to import, but also a large proportion of their 
imports correspond to internal operations with-
in the same transnational corporation, with the 
possibility that the prices fixed for the imports 
of inputs and capital goods may be considera-
bly different from those prevailing on the in-
ternational market. 
It may be noted that the practice of fixing 
'transfer prices' in the trade within a single 
transnational corporation has become genera-
lized and may often have more important ef-
fects than the actual financial transfers arising 
in connexion with such corporations' operations 
in Latin American countries. The transfer price 
fixing mechanism enables the transnational 
corporations to promote their interests at the 
world level —and in particular their world pro-
fitability— to the detriment ofthe national eco-
24See P. Malan and Regis Bonelli, "Os Limites do 
Possível: Notas sobre Balanço de Pagamento e Industria 
nos anos 70", in Pesquisa e Planejamento Econômico, 
IPEA, Rio de Janeiro, Vol. 6, August 1976, No. 2, pp. 390 et 
seq. 
nomic interests ofthe countries where they are 
operating. 
Thus, for example, transfer prices may be 
established within a transnational corporation 
in order "to reduce to the minimum payments 
in respect of dividends and taxes to local share-
holders and authorities; to take maximum ad-
vantage of State subsidies and bonuses; to eva-
de national controls on the repatriation of pro-
fits; to permit foreign exchange protection or 
speculation or accumulate cash balances in gi-
ven countries; or to use such prices as a market-
ing policy instrument in order to eliminate 
local competition",25 etc. 
In a study made in Colombia regarding the 
pharmaceutical industry, it was concluded that 
the total remittances to the exterior of'declared 
profits' by branches of transnational corpora-
tions represented 3.4%, royalties in respect of 
technical assistance 14%, and over-invoicing 
the impressive figure of 82.5%. Also, "out of 19 
foreign pharmaceutical enterprises studied in 
Chile it was found that in six of them over-
invoicing came to less than 30%; in another 
25See UNCTAD, Intra-firm transactions and their 
impact on trade and development, Geneva, Seminar Pro-
gramme Report Series No. 2, May 1978, pp. 5 et seq. 
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three it was between 3 1 % and 100%, and in the 
remaining ten it amounted to over 100%".2(i 
In other economic sectors where the in-
puts display a higher level of 'standardization' 
and there is more diversified international sup-
ply, the levels of transfer price fixing may be 
lower. However, in order to gain an idea of its 
effects on the rate of real profits, a hypothetical 
exercise may be carried out on the basis of 
assumed over-inovicing.27 Let us assume that 
imported inputs represent 20% of the value of 
the sales of the branches ; that the overpricing is 
also at the rate of 20%, and that sales represent 
approximately double the capital invested. In 
these circumstances, it may be concluded that 
the profits obtained in this way amount to 8% of 
the capital invested. If this 8% and the 2 to 3% 
corresponding to royalties are added to the ave-
rage profitability stated by the United States 
Depar tment of Trade (11%), we obtain a level 
of real profitability which is approximately 
double that of the nominal figure.28 
In the face of these problems of transfer 
price fixing and the imposition of restrictive 
trade practices, which are difficult to control by 
the host countries, the developing countries 
have been insisting on the need to adopt a code 
of conduct for transnational corporations to 
oblige them to refrain from such practices and 
respect the laws, regulations and exclusive ju-
risdiction of the host country. 
Although the formulation and internatio-
nal acceptance of a code of conduct for transna-
tional enterprises is obviously a complex and 
difficult process, since the industrialized coun-
tries oppose more effective control of such cor-
porations, the unity of action displayed by the 
developing countries may be decisive in secu-
ring its adoption. 
Taking up once again a more global view-
2( iSee F. Fajnzylber, "La empresa internacional en la 
industrialización de América Latina", in J. Serra, Desarro-
llo latinoamericano: ensayos críticos, Mexico City, Fondo 
de Cultura Económica, 1974, pp. 135 et seq. 
2 7Constantino Vaitsos has mentioned figures oí 40%, 
25.5% and 16.7% of overpricing for the branches producing 
rubber products, chemicals and electronic equipment, res-
pectively. See "Transfer of Resources and Preservation of 
Monopoly Rents", Harvard University Development Advi-
sory Service, May 1970, Annex I. 
2 8 F , Fajnzylber, "La empresa internacional en la in-
dustrialización de America Latina", op. cit., p. 136. 
point which indicates a probable crisis point in 
the present style of development, some ten-
dencies become clear which it might be useful 
to summarize: 
—concentrated and exclusive develop-
ment favours and pennits the existence of dy-
namic demand in the system, and this demand, 
in view of the characteristics of the production 
structure of Latin American industry, leads to 
high and growing import coefficients; 
—in these circumstances, in order to con-
t inue to maintain high growth rates it would be 
necessary to continue expanding imports, 
which are increasingly essential for the func-
tioning of the dynamic sectors; 
—the dominating presence of transnatio-
nal corporations in the shaping of 'elitist' pat-
terns of consumption and in the ownership of 
large segments of the sectors of production makes 
this external dependence even more marked,29 
and places the entrepreneurial rationale of a 
world enterprise above national interests, 
involving a strong propensity to import and the 
use of arbitrary external trade practices in tran-
sactions carried out within the same enterprise; 
—there is asymmetry between the expan-
sion of imports and the generation of the capa-
city to pay for these by increasing the value of 
exports, as is shown by the increasingly high 
levels of absorption of external financing and 
the consequent dizzy rise in external indeb-
tedness: US$ 167 billion in 1979 as against US$ 
56 billion in 1974, even taking into account 
only the Latin American non-oil-exporting 
countries.30 
2i)It is worth recalling that even the energy dependen-
ce of our countries is an imitation of the 'civilization based 
on oil at a. dollar a barrel'. Thus, Latin America at present 
uses only 5% of its hydroelectric power potential, whereas 
a country like Brazil depends on hydrocarbons for more 
than 40% of its total energy. See J. Goldenberg, "Estrategia 
energética para países desenvolvidos e em desenvolvi-
mento" , in Pesquisa e Planejamento Econômico, IPEA, 
Rio de Janeiro, No. 9, April 1979, pp. 87 et seq. 
.'tüxhis asymmetry, as we shall see in the following 
section, has its real origin in the asymmetry of the external 
trade in goods produced by different sectors. In Latin Ame-
rica, exports of'basic commodities are 2.4 times greater than 
imports of the same goods, while at the other extreme, the 
exports of products of the metal manufactures and machi-
nery industry amount to barely 0.2% of the respective im-
ports. See Norberto González and Octavio Rodríguez, El 
desarrollo latinoamericano y la estrategia externa, 
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IV 
Redefinition of the style of development and the role of 
the transnational corporations 
In the context described above —marked by 
unacceptable distortions at the internal level 
and contradictions which are becoming more 
and more acute at the external level— it is es-
sential to consider the need for a redefinition of 
the region's form of development. 
This section seeks to explore some possi-
bilities and ways of reorganizing the dynamics 
of growth. It aims to examine the possible di-
mensions of the external market (both of the 
centres and of the region) and the internal mar-
ket, with special attention to the role played by 
the transnational corporations in each of the 
possibilities examined. 
The explicit consideration of the transna-
tional corporations within the possibilities of 
redefining development courses is related with 
two types of concerns. On the one hand, since 
the transnational corporations are located in 
the sectors of greatest relative dynamism of the 
present form of development, which is orien-
ted towards the consumer society, it is natural 
to ask what resistance they would put up to a 
new pattern of resource allocation which alters 
the present articulation of growth forces. More-
over, the relative weight of foreign capital in 
the economies of the countries which have ad-
vanced furthest in the present form of devel-
opment makes such capital an important cen-
tral figure in defining the possibilities of a new 
style: a new form of economic growth could 
hardly be set afoot without the participation of 
the transnational corporations. 
1. Trade with the centres: the external market 
Reference was made in the preceding sec-
tion to the existence of an imbalance in the 
CEPAL, Santiago, 1978 (preliminary mimeographed ver-
sion), pp. 8 et seq., and also O. Rodriguez, La teoria del 
subdesarrolio de la CEPAL, Mexico City, Siglo XXI Edito-
res, 1980, pp. 254 et seq. 
external trade of Latin America with the central 
countries. This imbalance is due to the produc-
tive structure of Latin American industry, 
which is not capable of satisfying the needs for 
certain imports and/or for the capital goods 
which involve more complex technology. 
Thus, the specialization of the region in inter-
national trade and in the international division 
of labour is of the inter-sectoral type: Latin 
America produces and exports mainly in a few 
sectors (primary commodities, consumer goods 
and intermediate imports whose manufacture 
is not very complex), all of which leads to a 
tendency towards imbalance. This specializa-
tion also means that the region exports goods 
which have less income elasticity and has to 
import the products of high-tech no logy indus-
tries, the demand for which is much more dy-
namic. 
These circumstances perpetuate the im-
balance, which is aggravated, as we have al-
ready seen, by the presence of branches of the 
transnational corporations, and the possibility 
of continued growth remains subject to the ca-
pacity to absorb external financing. In order to 
maintain growth in the long term it is essential 
that the foreign exchange generated by Latin 
America's exports should grow at least at the 
same rate as the servicing of the external debt. 
This situation obviusly demands strong efforts 
to apply export-oriented strategies, which be-
come vital for the maintenance of growth. 
It is important, however, to have a correct 
picture of the significance of the export effort 
for the different types of countries of the region. 
For the small countries with a small domestic 
market, exports represent a dynamic market 
which is of fundamental importance for domes-
tic activities, but undoubtedly the situation is 
not quite the same for the countries of relative-
ly larger size. For these, the significance of 
exports does not lie in their dynamic effect on 
domestic activities, as may be seen from the 
analysis given in table 2, which shows the low 
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Table 2 
MANUFACTURING INDUSTRIES: RELATION BETWEEN EXPORTS 
AND GROSS VALUE OF PRODUCTION, 1974 
Foodstuffs, beverages and tobacco 
Textiles, clothing and leather industry 
Wood and wood products, including furniture 
Paper and paper products; printing and publishing 
Chemicals; petroleum and coal-based chemical 
products; rubber and plastics 
Non-metallic mineral products, except petroleum-
and coal-based products 
Basic metal industries 











































Source: Aníbal Pinto, La internacionalización y la búsqueda de un nuevo patrón de relacionamiento externo: razones, 
peligros y opciones, CEPAL (preliminary version, mimeo), 1979, p. 43. 
«Andean sub-region in this table: Venezuela, Colombia, Ecuador, Peru, Bolivia, Chile. Table excludes 
petroleum refining in the case of Venezuela and production of non-ferrous metals in the case of Bolivia, 
Chi le and Peru. 
ra t io b e t w e e n expor t s a n d the gross va lue of 
p r o d u c t i o n for t h e t h r e e count r ies of largest 
r e l a t i v e d e v e l o p m e n t a n d for t he Andean sub -
r e g i o n . I n 1974, only in t he case of the bas ic 
m e t a l i n d u s t r i e s of Mexico d id this propor t ion 
r e a c h t h e f igure of 10%, w h i c h is t he h ighes t of 
all the percentages recorded. For the large 
countries, the great importance of exports lies 
in the fact that they enable them to absorb the 
external financing through which they can con-
t inue to pay for their heavy import needs. 
Whatever the significance of the markets of 
the centres for the different types of countries 
of the region, it is important to ask ourselves 
what possibilities there are that access to the 
markets of the central economies can expand at 
the rate required by the development of the 
regional economy. 
The predominance of primary commodi-
ties in the region's exports still persists and will 
undoubtedly continue to do so, at least in the 
medium term. Thus, exports of primary com-
modities and fuels represented about 85% of 
the total in 1975 (47% being accounted for by 
raw materials and food). Even for Argentina 
and Brazil the proportion was close to 75%, and 
the fact that it was somewhat smaller in Mexico 
was due to re-exports of goods produced under 
the subcontracting system. Furthermore, the 
world trade in primary commodities grows 
much more slowly than that in manufactures: 
be tween 1950 and 1975 the proportion of raw 
materials and food in total world trade steadily 
dropped from 46% to 19%, while over the same 
period the share of manufactures rose from 44% 
to 60% and that of fuels from 10% to 19%. We 
should not be surprised, then, that against this 
background of world trade the position of Latin 
America has suffered a marked deterioration.31 
The past and present vicissitudes brought 
about by basing the export effort on primary 
commodities are well known. In order to avoid 
repeating well-known arguments, it suffices to 
consider some of the details assembled by the 
World Bank on the prospects for world exports. 
Table 3 clearly demonstrates that the possibili-
ties of expanding trade in primary commodities 
will be more than overtaken by the growth 
prospects of exports of manufactures, although 
3lSee CEPAL, The economic and social develop-
ment..., op. cit., Vol. II, pp. letseq. 
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Table 3 
GROWTH RATES OF EXPORTS BY MAIN CATEGORIES: 
HISTORICAL TREND AND PROJECTIONS 
(At constant 1975 prices) 











































































Source; World Bank, World Development Report, 1978, quoted by Aníbal Pinto, La internacÍonalización...,op. cit., p. 32. 
this is in no way intended to suggest that we 
should overlook the conjunctural possibilities 
or achieving substantial successes in exports of 
primary commodities, especially taking into 
account the present diversity of products which 
the region can export. 
From another point of view (and now brin-
ging the main actor onto the stage), it cannot be 
den ied that success in the export of primary 
commodities is not unrelated to the operations 
of transnational corporations. Both in the pro-
duction of some types of foodstuffs and in the 
marketing of the raw materials which enjoy the 
most dynamic demand, the transnational cor-
porations frequently play a leading role and are 
capable of siphoning-off a significant share of 
the profits from this trade. 
It may be assumed with some degree of 
certainty, however, that the export strategy of 
Latin America will not be based on the possible 
dynamism of the trade in primary commodities 
unless there are extraordinary changes in pri-
ces, and even then these would be partial, cy-
clical or conjunctural phenomena. 
As regards the trade in manufactures, Latin 
America's exports expanded during the period 
1955-1975 at an annual average rate of close on 
17% at current prices, while over the period 
1965-1877 the share of these goods in total ex-
ports rose from 8.7% to 23.6%. For the large 
countries, which are responsible for almost 
70% of the manufactures exported by the re-
gion, the proportion of exports of manufactures 
in their total exports came to 33% in 1977, while 
in the medium-sized countries the share was 
not more than 8%. The figures for the Central 
American Common Market are obviously high-
er because of the incidence of intra-regional 
trade (see table 4). 
These figures clearly show a positive trend 
in that there is a higher degree of industrial 
processing of exports. Perhaps the picture will 
be more complete, however, if we analyse table 
5, which shows the composition of exports of 
manufactures, by groups of countries. 
The results are not surprising. Almost 90% 
of the region's total exports of metal products, 
machinery and equipment come from the large 
countries, while these countries also predomi-
nate in the export of non-durable consumer 
goods. For the medium-sized and small coun-
tries, the growth possibilities have been limi-
ted so far to exports of non-durable consumer 
goods and intermediate goods. 
We may now ask ourselves if these lighter 
goods and goods involving more advanced 
technology will have access to the markets of 
the central countries compatible with the suc-
cess of the export strategies of the various coun-
tries of the region. We shall first consider the 
case of the lighter goods, which are exported 
both by the small countries and the large ones. 
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Table 4 
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN: EXPORTS OF MANUFACTURES 
AND THEIR PROPORTION IN TOTAL EXPORTS OF GOODS, 
BY GROUPS OF COUNTRIES, IN 1965, 1970,1975 AND 1977 
(Percentages of FOB values) 
Groups of countries 
Latin America and the Caribbean 
Large countries» 
Medium-sized countries1» 
Medium-sized countries less 
Venezuela 
Central American Common Market* 
Other small Latin American 
countries e 
C a r i b b e a n 







































































Source: Aníbal Pinto, La inter nacionalización,,., op. cit., p. 40.. 
"Argentina, Brazil and Mexico. 
bChile, Colombia, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela. 
L
'Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua. 
''Partly estimated figures. 
cBolivia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador and Paraguay. 
'Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago. 
Clearly, these goods represent exports of 
great interest for the region, since in their case 
Latin America has natural comparative advan-
tages or else advantages acquired through its 
industrialization process, and the acceleration 
of external sales of such goods can represent a 
powerful contribution of foreign exchange to 
the external sector. 
Various export lines in this field have in-
deed had marked success in the past decade, 
which might give the idea that here there is a 
promising field for changing the region's tradi-
tional position on external markets. However, 
the conditions under which these goods gained 
access to those markets lead to the conclusion 
that in this kind of exports "there is nothing 
worse than success" as Aníbal Pinto said in a 
recent study. 
Thus, in proportion as Latin American ex-
ports of products begin to reach levels which 
make them significant competitors for the local 
industries in the central countries, the latter 
countries begin to place restrictions on these 
imports,32 and the phenomenon of protection-
ism has become so serious and widespread that 
it is becoming increasingly difficult for the re-
gion to achieve success in any export strategy, 
at least as far as a large variety and quantity of 
products is concerned. 
The practices used are very diverse, ex-
tending from effective tariff protection, which 
has little to do with nominal tariff rates (as we 
may see from table 6), to the application of 
quantitative restrictions, countervailing duties, 
differential treatment for Latin America, sli-
ding scales of duties, etc. If these instruments 
do not prove fully effective, then bilateral 
agreements are resorted to or some countries of 
the region are persuaded to impose 'voluntary' 
restrictions on their own exports. 
This is not the place to go into this phe-
32
 Well-known cases are those affecting exports of tex-
tiles, footwear, meat for the European Common Market, 
steel, zinc and a multitude of other products even extend-
ing to restrictions on exports of orchids from Colombia. 
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Table 5 
L A T I N A M E R I C A A N D T H E CARIBBEAN: STRUCTURE A N D ORIGIN O F EXPORTS O F 
M A N U F A C T U R E S BY K I N D O F P R O D U C T S A N D GROUPS O F C O U N T R I E S , 1975 
(Percentages of FOB value) 
Groups of countries 






















































































Source: Aníbal Pinto, La internationalization..., op. cit., p . 41. 
«Includes textiles, clothing, footwear, furniture, printing, publishing and the like, foodstuffs, beverages and tobacco, and 
other manufacturing industries. 
' ' Includes wood and cork, paper and paper products, chemicals and plastics, rubber products, earthenware, china and 
porcelain goods, glass and glass products, other non-metallic products, and iron and steel. 
^Includes metal products, machinery and transport equipment and scientific and professional equipment. 
cl
 Argentina, Brazil and Mexico. 
«Chile, Colombia, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela. 
'Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Nicaragua. 
^Bolivia, Dominican Republic, Ecuador and Paraguay. 
'•Bahamas, Barbados, Belize, Grenada, Guyana, Jamaica, Suriname and Trinidad and Tobago. 
nomenon, and tackling the varied and some-
times imaginative forms of protectionism prac-
t iced by the centres would be beyond the pur-
view of this study.33 It is of vital importance, 
however, to note that whatever the attempted 
justification of .such measures —and this takes 
very diverse forms, from 'stagflation', via the 
bargaining power of some relatively backward 
sectors, to problems of disorganization of mar-
kets— protectionism threatens Latin America's 
3 3 There are a large number of articles on this topic. 
Some recent studies are those of Pedro Mendive, "Protec-
tionism and development", in CEPAL Review, No. 6, 
August 1978; Gary Sampson, "Contemporary protectio-
nism and the exports of developing countries", CEPAL 
Review, No. 8, August 1979, and Pedro Mendive, "Exports 
of manufactures", CEPAL Review, No. 10, April 1980. 
chances of being able to exploit its comparative 
advantages in trade. Moreover, no favourable 
changes are to be glimpsed on the future hori-
zon: it may rather be anticipated that as long as 
the central economies continue to suffer from 
modest growth rates and the problems of infla-
tion and the need for reorganization of the less 
dynamic sectors of production persists, the 
phenomenon of 'conditioned free trade' will 
t end rather to get worse. 
As regards products of more advanced 
technology, the average rate of protection has 
been going down steadily since 1950. Through 
various multilateral negotiations (the Dillon 
negotiations, the Kennedy Round and the To-
kyo Round), eight developed countries mana-
ged to reduce the average rate of tariffs levied 
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Table 6 
NOM IN AL AND EFFECTIVE TARIFF PROTECTION APPLIED BY THE DEVELOPED COUNTRIES 
T O GOODS WHICH ARE O F IMPORTANCE IN THE EXPORTS OF LATIN AMERICA 
(Percentages) 
United States European Economic Community Japan 
Nominal Effective Nominal Effective Nominal Effective 
protection protection protection protection protection protection 
Processed foodstuffs 9.3 22.1 13.8 * 27.9 68 
Textiles and made-up goods 23.8 42.5 14.5 40 15.4 45 
Light industries 9.4 24.1 7.2 15 10.3 26 
More complex industries 6.7 16.2 8.8 22 11.0 22 
Source: CEPAL, The economic and social development..., op. cit., Vol. II, p. 15. 
aNo data available. 
from 50% in 1950 to 9% in 1967.34 Here, howev-
er, there is an obvious paradox in the centre-
periphery relations. "Decisions have been 
adopted to liberalize trade in those products in 
which the periphery lacks comparative advan-
tages for the time being owing to the technical 
and economic superiority of the centres, which 
is manifested chiefly through the transnational 
corporations. And the goods that escape libera-
lization —defended by various forms of protec-
tionism— are the manufactures (and primary 
commodities too) in respect of which the peri-
phery does enjoy comparative advantages, or 
easily could do so through its own enterprises' 
efforts."35 
It might be argued, however, that if the 
goods containing the most advanced technolo-
gy, which are fundamentally traded among the 
centres, are subject to low tariffs, then Latin 
America —or at least those countries of the re-
gion of the highest relative development— 
should have considerable possibilities of ex-
panding exports of these items. 
In this respect, it is once more necessary to 
consider the role of the transnational corpora-
tions, for the production of manufactures con-
34Belgium, Federal Republic of Germany, France, Ja-
pan, the Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom and 
the United States. 
35R. Prebisch, "Towards a theory of change", op. cit., p. 
191. 
taining advanced technology in the region de-
pends largely on foreign-controlled firms. As 
we have already seen elsewhere in this study, it 
is mainly in the dynamic and modern sectors of 
the Latin American countries that the branches 
of foreign firms'are located, and the possibility 
of Latin America's exports in this field being 
able to enter the select group of central coun-
tries depends largely on the 'bridge' that the 
transnational corporations may build to this ef-
fect. 
Once more it seems appropriate to ask our-
selves whether the interests of these world en-
terprises coincide with the national objectives 
of promoting this type of exports. 
First of all, it is important to bear in mind 
that the transnational corporations in Latin 
America seem rather reluctant to engage in ex-
ports, since they entered our countries with the 
idea above all of gaining monopoly positions 
which would enable them to take easy advan-
tage of the domestic market with little or no 
competition. Table 7, which gives data on Bra-
zil and Mexico —outstanding examples of the 
presence of transnational corporations in the 
most dynamic sectors— clearly shows that the 
percentages of exports by these sectors were 
more or less insignificant in 1972: in no case 
did they amount to more than 8.2%, and the 
respective national averages were 3.4% and 
4.9%, a tendency which has persisted to the 
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Table 7 
BRAZIL AND MEXICO: SALES BY BRANCHES OF UNITED STATES TRANSNATIONAL 
CORPORATIONS IN THE MANUFACTURING SECTOR, 1972 
(Millions of dollars) 






















































Source: U.S. Senate, Multinational Corporations in Brazil and Mexico..., op. cit. 
"Excluding rubber. 
present day. Similarly, it is instructive to note 
that the exports made by the United States 
transnational corporations located in the indus-
trial sector in the region were equivalent to 
only 6% of their total sales in 1976, having 
shown a considerable decline since 1966, 
when they came to 10%. 
It is even more enlightening, however, to 
examine the channels through which the ex-
ports of goods of more advanced technology are 
made. In this respect, tables 8 and 9 enable us 
to see that, in the case of branches of United 
States transnational corporations in Latin Amer-
ica (see footnote 22), the percentages of total 
exports of certain manufactures carried out 
through the internal trade within these world 
enterprises exceeded 73% in the case of Brazil 
and 82% in that of Mexico (overall average), 
compared with 68% and 54%, respectively, in 
1960. For Brazil, except in the areas of metals, 
food products and rubber, the exports made 
within the transnational corporations always 
represented over 50% of the total exports of 
those branches, amounting to as much as 88% 
in the case of transport equipment and 100% in 
the case of technical and scientific instruments. 
In the case of Mexico, the picture is even more 
eloquent , since in no area is the percentage of 
sales within the same transnational corpora-
tions below 55% and in the electrical machine-
ry field it exceeds 89%, in technical and scienti-
fic instruments it exceeds 96%, and it is practi-
cally 100% in transport equipment. When these 
transactions are carried out with the parent 
firms of the transnational corporations, as in the 
case of exports to the United States, the trade 
within a single firm assumes proportions which 
frequently exceed 90%, especially in the bran-
ches of industry of greatest relative dynamism. 
In these circumstances, taking as our star-
ting point the representative example of the 
United States transnational corporations, it can 
easily be concluded that the possibilities of any 
considerable expansion in Latin America's ex-
ports to the centres of the products of greatest 
relative market dynamism must inevitably en-
joy the assistance of the transnational corpora-
tions and fit within their overall entrepreneu-
rial activity. 
The small share which the region's exports 
of some dynamic items have in the markets of 
the central countries,36 together with the fre-
quen t imposition of contractual restriction and 
36By way of example, it may be mentioned that imports 
from Latin America of electrical machinery, non-electrical 
machinery and transport equipment represented 12%, 3% 
and 2.3%, respectively, of the total imports of the EEC 
countries, the United States and Japan (excluding regional 
trade) in 1975. See O E C D , Trade by Commodities, Market 
Summaries: Imports, Paris, Vol. 1,1975. 
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Table 8 
BRAZIL AND MEXICO: DESTINATION OF EXPORTS BY BRANCHES O F UNITED 
STATES TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS, 1972 












































































































Source: U.S. Senate, Multinational Corporations in Brazil and Mexico..., op. cit. 
Table 9 
BRAZIL AND MEXICO: INTRA-FIRM INDUSTRIAL EXPORTS BY BRANCHES OF 
UNITED STATES TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS» 















































Source: U.S. Senate, Multinational Corporations in Brazil and Mexico..., op. cit.t pp. 77 and 129. 
•'For 1972, includes 82% of United States direct investment in Brazil and 79% in Mexico. 
hNo exports recorded. 
restrictive trade practices in respect of this type 
of exports, would seem to indicate that Latin 
America's presence as a participant in the dy-
namic trade of the centres does not fit in with 
the interests of the transnational corporations, 
which are the privileged agents in this field. 
2. Integration: the regional market 
T h e importance of the intra-regional market of 
Latin America grows in our estimation if we 
bear in mind the steady loss of relative weight 
suffered by the region in world trade. Between 
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1960 and 1977, Latin America's share in world 
exports fell from 6.2% to 4.5%, while over the 
same period the exports of Latin American 
countries to the rest of the region rose almost 
three times faster than the growth rate of sales 
outside the region, increasing their share in 
total exports from 8% to 17%.37 
Moreover, intra-regional trade also as-
sumes importance because of its structure, 
s ince it is immediately clear that manufactures 
have a much greater weight in it than in exports 
to the centres, to such a point that for a group of 
countries38 of LAFTA, this weight amounted to 
5 3 % of total exports to the region. Likewise, 
within total exports of manufactures to the 
region, those involving the most advanced 
technology, such as intermediate goods and 
metal products and machinery, represented 
77% of the total for this same group of countries. 
This situation indicates that there are 
frankly favourable possibilities for the growth 
of the external sector of the region. Thus, 
projections for 1985 show that Latin America's 
imports of machinery and equipment alone 
could amount to some US$ 24 billion in that 
year: a market which is undoubtedly big 
enough to permit import substitution processes 
that are efficient and competitive at the inter-
national level. 
However, this prospect must be toned 
down somewhat in the light of some problems 
which are characteristic of the integration pro-
cess. 
To start with the basic topic of this study, 
we must ask ourselves what role the transna-
tional corporations have played so far in intra-
regional trade and what their foreseeable 
future interests would be. Clearly, the forego-
ing means that the transnational corporations 
cannot be considered as neutral with respect to 
the integration processes. In fact, they become 
one of the most important agents of co-opera-
tion, influencing policies and participating in 
their execution, and in their efforts to further 
their entrepreneurial interests they may consti-
tute an integrating or on the contrary a disinte-
3 7 See CEPAL, The economic and social develop-
ment..., op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 95 et seq. 
3f iArgentina, Brazil, Colombia, Paraguay, Peru and 
Uruguay. 
grating force.39 I t goes without saying that it is 
not an easy matter to analyse the role of the 
transnational corporations in the integration 
processes. Sometimes they have been an inte-
grating force, representing a bolder agent than 
governments and national enterprises, but on 
other occasions they have been just the op-
posite. 
In the regional integration of Latin Amer-
ica, the transnational corporations have general-
ly pursued two objectives: furthering and con-
trolling the forms of co-operation which are 
favourable to them, and taking advantage of 
regional market opportunities within their 
perspective as world enterprises. 
With regard to the first objective, it has 
been the practice of the transnational corpora-
tions to participate actively in the meetings and 
decisions regarding regional integration. In the 
case of LAFTA, in the 194 meetings held over 
eleven years to negotiate agreements on indus-
trial tariff concessions, examination of the 
proceedings of the meetings shows that 50% of 
the participants represented branches of trans-
national corporations, and that in dynamic 
trade sectors such as electrical and electronic 
products, office equipment and chemical and 
pharmaceutical products, the proportion rose 
to 80%.40 I t was not only transnational corpora-
tions interested in promoting some particular 
type of integration scheme which were repre-
sented, however: at the meetings in question, 
most of the transnational corporations repre-
sented did not export a significant part of their 
total sales, and their interest lay in keeping 
watch on the progress of the integration process 
and trying to impose their entrepreneurial 
logic over the considerations of integration.41 
The same logic is shown in the way that 
the transnational corporations operate when 
3ySee in this respect C. Vaitsos, Crisis en la coopera-
ción económica regional, Mexico City, ILET, 1978, pp. 42 
et seq. 
40At some meetings Cyanamid was represented by six 
subsidiaries; Pfizer by five; Ciba-Geigy, Sandozand Wyeth 
by four; Bayer, Hoechst, Johnson, Rhodia, Merck and Eli 
Lilly by three. See C. Vaitsos, op. cit., pp. 47 et seq. 
4 , C . Vaitsos, op. cit., p. 47; R. Almeida, Reflexiones 
sobre ta integración latinoamericana, E/CEPAL/L.214, 
February 1980, pp. 55 et seq. 
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seeking to take advantage of the regional mar-
ket. Table 10 shows that in 1972 some of the 
most dynamic intra-regional export items were 
marketed through transactions within a single 
enterprise, at least in the case of the branches of 
United States enterprises. From this table it 
can be seen that the average percentages of 
operations be tween branches of the same firm 
in the total exports of manufactures to the 
region exceeded 63% and 69% for Brazil and 
Mexico, respectively, and were even over 80% 
in cases such as transport equipment and 
technical and scientiiic instruments. It can thus 
be seen once again that the products of greater 
relative trading dynamism —those that involve 
the most advanced technological processes— 
are under the domination of the transnational 
corporations and are traded among the centres 
or within the world enterprises, between the 
parent firm and its branches or between 
branches, as in the case of Latin American 
intra-regional trade. 
Table 10 
BRAZIL AND MEXICO: EXPORTS BY BRANCHES OF UNITED STATES 
TRANSNATIONAL CORPORATIONS TO LATIN AMERICA, 1972 


























































Source: U.S. Senate, Multinational Corporations in Brazil and Mexico..., op. cit. 
Thus, the intra-regional process which 
serves the interests of the transnational corpo-
rations calls for a domestic base for exporting 
dynamic products from some countries where 
industrialization is more advanced and an 
expansion of the production and input linkages 
with the parent firm in the central countries. 
This explains why in 1974 intra-regional ex-
ports of the metal manufactures and machinery 
industries represented 71% of total exports of 
such goods in the case of Argentina, 45% in the 
ease of Brazil and 2 1 % in the case of Mexico, 
whereas intra-regional imports of these same 
goods by the three countries did not amount in 
that year to even 1% of total imports of such 
items.42 
The foregoing brings us to another point of 
vital importance for the future success of the 
integration processes. A problem of trade 
imbalance has in fact been arising in intra-
regional trade similar to that which exists in the 
trade relations of Latin America and the central 
countries. The large countries export to the rest 
of the region goods whose demand has high 
income elasticity, while they import goods of 
42CEPAL, The economic and social development..., 
op. cit., Vol. II, pp. 106-107. 
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less income elasticity and less incorporated 
added value, and this obviously- leads to a 
chronic deficit on the part of the countries of 
less relative development {see table 11), thus 
discouraging them in their integration efforts. 
In this way, the advantages of integration 
snowball for the large countries, for which, 
however, this process does not come to be es-
sential, since they enjoy the reserve repre-
sented by an actual or potential domestic mar-
ket of appreciable size. In contrast, the other 
economies, which receive relatively smaller 
gains in the present forms of integration, are 
those which* actively promote and vitally need 
this form of trade. This does not mean, of 
course, that the countries of relatively less 
development would be better off without inte-
gration, or that without it the large countries 
would stop displaying big differences with 
regard to the others in their favourable trade 
balances. But it does mean that there is an 
inverse relation between the benefits of inte-
gration and the impulse to further it, and that 
the process is becoming increasingly difficult. 
T h e problems set forth here —the role of 
the transnational corporations and the trade 
imbalance— are only two of the main questions 
among a number of other problems which dis-
courage and impede the process. Other factors 
which enter into the situation are the attitudes 
of private national agents which are opposed to 
integration; the positions of countries —espe-
cially those of greater relative development— 
which sometimes confuse the internal and ex-
ternal levels and maintain that before trying to 
secure regional integration it is necessary to 
achieve horizontal and vertical domestic inte-
gration, as though there were some inherent 
contradiction in progressing at both levels at 
once; grudges deriving from geopolitical dif-
ferences; and in some cases the short-sighted 
desire to promote autarkic national develop-
ment or a type of insertion in the international 
economy which is viable for a single country 
bu t not for the whole region.43 
Obviously, such differences and opposing 
forces should not be 'minimized'. However, it 
43Rómulo Almeida, op. cit., tries to make a character-
ization of the position of the social groups with respect to 
integration. See pp. 52 et seq. 
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must be very clearly asserted that the best 
answer to fears or contrary attitudes, and the 
best alternative for reducing the dominance of 
foreign interests in the region, would be pre-
cisely to carry out effective integration. In the 
face of the transnational corporations, effective 
union among the countries of the region would 
make it possible to secure homogeneity in their 
policies as regards the treatment of foreign 
capital (Decision 24 of the Andean Pact is an 
excellent example of what can be achieved 
when the countries unite), and if Latin America 
acts as a single bloc, it has sufficient importance 
and relative weight in the world community to 
make it a better proposition for the transnation-
al corporations to adapt themselves to the inter-
ests of the region than to set themselves aside 
or stay away from a dynamic and profitable 
market. On the other side, the sensitivities of 
private national agents and governments 
would gradually react to a concrete reality seen 
to be of mutual benefit, so that the current 
points of friction would be smoothed down 
with the passage of time. 
The possibilities of Latin American inte-
gration depend directly on the firm political 
will of the countries, and this, in its turn, must 
b e based on their understanding of the mutual 
benefits involved in reciprocal trade and the 
need for the objective of integration to become 
part of concrete national development strate-
gies and thus contribute to the search for solu-
tions to basic problems of current development 
such as income distribution, unemployment 
and external vulnerability. 
3. Integrative development: 
the domestic market 
Latin American economic studies usually 
emphasize that the domestic market is the main 
focus of economic dynamism and that its impor-
tance will be even greater in the future. Clear-
ly, this observation is basically correct, but at 
the same time it involves a generalization of 
different national conditions and indistin-
guishably merges fundamental differences of 
meaning as to what should be understood by 
the domestic market. 
For the purposes of the present study, 
which seeks to identify a new form of economic 
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Table 11 
LAFTA: TRADE BALANCES 
( 1962 = 100) 
























































Source: R. Almeida, Reflexiones sobre la integración latinoamericana, op. cit., p. 31. 
growth and promote a different form of action 
by the main actors (especially the transnational 
corporations), it is of primary importance to 
establish some distinctions between countries, 
even if only in broad lines, and to understand 
clearly that 'domestic market' does not neces-
sarily mean 'socially integrated market'. 
It was already noted earlier that the analy-
sis contained in this study has a certain 'bias' 
towards the large countries. Having made this 
observation, we shall now deal firstly, and 
perhaps in greater detail, with the topic of the 
domestic market in this group of countries, 
where the present economic dynamism is un-
doubtedly linked with that market. We already 
saw elsewhere in this study that the sectors of 
greatest relative dynamism, where the pres-
ence of the transnational corporations is more 
concentrated, are more basically oriented 
towards domestic consumption, and their ex-
ports are as yet of little significance. 
This does not mean, however, that the 
market available to these countries for goods 
with more advanced technology is comparable 
to similar markets in the central economies. 
Obviously, consumption of this type of goods is 
concentrated in a minority section of the popu-
lation, and this minority does not attain suf-
ficient magnitude in absolute terms to enable 
efficient production processes to be carried out 
and to take full advantages of economies of 
scale.44 
The counterpart of this concentrated and 
not very efficient supply structure is the pres-
ence of types of income concentration which 
give highly dynamic purchasing power in the 
upper and medium-upper income groups, 
capable of absorbing the higher cost structure 
(including profits). 
A basic contradiction thus takes shape in 
current development: systems whose average 
income would only be sufficient to cover the 
basic needs of the population can maintain and 
increase industrial structures comparable 
with those of countries where the average 
income is five or six times greater. 
Examining the problem from another 
angle, a CEPAL study noted as far back as 1975: 
"Judging by the number of inhabitants, Latin 
America as a whole and some individual coun-
tries in it have quite a big market. However, 
this size is more apparent than real. If we 
observe the behaviour of the demand of social 
sectors with different levels of income, we 
clearly see that only persons with an income of 
over 500 dollars per year generate a significant 
demand for non-food industrial goods. Over 
44See J. Ayza and N. González, op. cit., chapter III. 
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80% of the demand for non-food manufactures 
in Latin America comes from persons whose 
income is over the figure in question. Yet half 
the population has an income of less than 500 
dollars".45 
This makes up a structure of exclusive 
growth whose dynamism does not depend on 
the consumption of the broad domestic masses. 
Restrictive industrialization is not committed 
to general ized consumption, and can maintain 
its dynamism even though 50 to 60% of the 
population are not participating in it, provided 
that it can appropriate the economic surplus 
and distribute it in a 'suitable' manner. In ef-
fect, it owes its vitality to the consumption of 
the capitalist sector itself (of enterprises, the 
publ ic sector and high-income strata), doing 
wi thout the consumer market of the majority of 
the population. 
In this respect, it is important to note that 
the dynamic domestic market at the disposal of 
such economies should not be confused with a 
socially integrated market in which all income 
strata participate. 
The problem facing this type of growth is 
not, as some Latin American publications have 
assumed on more than one occasion, that there 
is insufficient domestic demand for the present 
dynamic sectors, since this demand is guar-
anteed by the maintenance of concentrated 
income structures. Its long-term difficulties 
actually arise as the result of at least two types 
of considerations already sketched out in this 
study. 
Firstly, it is unthinkable that development 
can continue in the long term unless its fruits 
are distr ibuted in a more equitable manner, 
and this conclusion stems not only from mini-
mum ethical considerations but also from the 
perfectly clear fact of the risks involved in the 
persistence of the present concentrating style. 
Secondly, we have already seen that the 
dynamism of this style is threatened by the 
growing external vulnerability, and that its 
persis tence may mean extension of the domina-
tion by the transnational corporations and the 
central economies over national destiny and 
freedom of action: in this respect (and in spite 
ttlbid., chapter III. 
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of the fact that this alone would be enough), 
what is involved is not only the growing ex-
ternal imbalances which, in the present inter-
national situation, are being solved through 
increased external indebtedness. It is neces-
sary to underline the world present here, since 
possible changes in world financing markets 
would mean a serious reverse for the prevailing 
style. 
I t must also be borne in mind that the 
dominating presence of transnational corpora-
tions in the dynamic sectors of these economies 
has already reached such a magnitude in abso-
lute and relative terms that these enterprises 
can exercise a decisive influence on the direc-
tions taken by national development. Some 
data showing the extent of this presence in the 
large countries were already presented earlier 
in this study. Here, solely by way of illustra-
tion, using the case of Brazil, it may be noted 
that if the average rate of profits of the transna-
tional corporations during the period 1968-
1972 ( 12%) is applied to the total foreign capital 
existing in Brazil in 1975, then the gross 
volume of profits would represent 16% of the 
income generated by exports in that year. Of 
course, there is no suggestion that remittances 
of profits of such magnitude could be carried 
out at any given moment, but the fact that such 
amounts are not repatriated opens the possi-
bilities of greater investments in expansion and 
in the purchase of national industries. Obvious-
ly, these circumstances postpone the problem, 
bu t they only put it further off in the future, 
without giving any solution.46 
Thus, maintenance of the long-term devel-
opment potential of the Latin American econo-
mies will inevitably involve profound changes 
in the present pattern of resource allocation. 
This means big changes in the distributive 
structure, productive employment for broad 
sectors of the population, and a considerable 
reduction in the vulnerability vis-à-vis the 
centres and transnational corporations. In 
short, it means setting up an integrated 
domestic market in which the growth incen-
tives are located at different degrees, in dif-
ferent forms and at different points in time —in 
46See P. Malan and R. Bonelli, up. cit., p. 396, 
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keeping with national conditions— by the 
basic general consumption of the whole popu-
lation. 
Of course future development, which must 
necessarily be of an integrative nature, will 
naturally have its external projection through 
intra-regional integration schemes which 
enable the transformation of productive struc-
tures to be continued on more suitable scales 
with greater efficiency, thus also forming a 
primary market which will serve as the basis for 
a new type of insertion in world trade. 
T h e considerations sketched out above 
also hold good, with a few modifications, for the 
case of the countries of less relative size. In 
these , too, we see the presence of concentrated 
income structures which prevent the incorpo-
ration of broad social strata into the domestic 
market for manufactures. Here, too, integrative 
development based on profound changes in the 
present allocation of resources could make pos-
sible the incorporation of these strata, which 
would not only mean economies of scale in 
some of the more advanced industries but 
would also boost the traditional industries 
producing non-durable consumer goods, for 
which there are not too many technical dif-
ficulties in most of the countries. 
In the case of this latter group of countries, 
however, it is more necessary even than in the 
case of the large countries to go beyond nation-
al borders if it is proposed to advance towards 
An attempt has been made in this study to show 
that in the long term the present form of growth 
of Latin America, unless subjected to profound 
changes, will aggravate the region's most cru-
cial problems: the concentrated income struc-
ture, extreme poverty, the absence of produc-
tive employment for great sectors of the 
population, the growing external vulnerability, 
and the progressive loss of national capacity for 
managing the economy. 
An effort was also made, from the very 
beginning of the study, to show that the present 
more complete industrialization. Their present 
external linkage, consisting of specialization in 
exports of traditional manufactures and advan-
tages backed up by their natural resource 
endowment , could be profoundly changed 
within an expanded intra-regional market. The 
process of effective integration would tend to 
correct structural imperfections, thus enabling 
the countries to develop basic and more 
advanced industries. The integration indus-
tries of the Central American Common Market 
and the programming areas of the Andean 
Group (petrochemicals, the motor industry, 
and industries producing metal products, 
machinery and equipment) are current exam-
ples of the path which it would be possible to 
travel in the future. 
Thus, both for the large countries and for 
those of smaller relative size, the future projec-
tion of development would point towards the 
strengthening of the domestic market by inte-
grating into it the sectors which are currently 
lagging behind, backed up by the dynamic 
impulses deriving from a real and effective 
process of regional integration. 
Of course, this new direction would raise 
various queries about the role of the internal 
and external forces currently involved in the 
process of the trans nationalization of develop-
ment. Clearly, however, it would not be pos-
sible to deal with this matter fully within the 
limits of the present document. 
problems and the fact that they have been 
becoming more acute are not due to physical 
impediments of the productive forces of the 
region. Indeed, the development already 
achieved gives grounds for hope that these 
distortions can be solved on the basis of the 
region's productive potential; the persistence 
of exclusive and vulnerable forms of growth is 
merely due to the way in which the economic 
agents have acted in the region. An effort has 
been made to analyse among these agents, in 
particular, the action of the transnational corpo-
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rations in order to clarify their 'impact' on the 
formation of the present imitative style of de-
ve lopment and the conditioning factors which 
their presence imposes on the search for new 
directions. 
The hypothesis formulated here is that 
there would appear to be a contradiction 
be tween the form of operation of the transna-
tional corporations, which is subordinated to 
the internal entrepreneurial logic of the world 
firm, and the most representative and legitimate 
national objectives, which, for their part, should 
be defined on the basis of a search for a style of 
development which integrates the great mas-
ses within the countries. 
This contradiction is manifested, of course, 
at the internal level, where the relative weight 
of the transnational corporations in the most 
dynamic sectors makes them a particularly 
powerful economic agent. The necessary 
search for new dynamic impulses oriented 
towards the satisfaction of the needs of broad 
sectors of the population could conflict with the 
interests of the branches of world enterprises, 
which are deeply committed to restrictive and 
'elitist ' industrialization. 
On the other hand, the external projection 
of Latin America also comes into conflict with 
the interests of the transnational corporations. 
In this respect, an attempt has been made to 
show that their action as a bridge in trade 
towards the central countries has been in line 
with criteria which do not favour the solution of 
the existing commercial imbalance but instead 
tend to make it even more serious in view of 
these corporations' tendency to import and 
their reluctance to export, both of which repre-
sent the internal interests of the big firms. 
Similarly, special mention was made of the 
action of the transnational corporations in 
attempts at regional integration, and it was 
observed that their entrepreneurial logic in-
clined them towards opposing processes likely 
to involve regional agreement on policies 
regarding foreign capital and planned regional 
industrial development. 
Thus, both at the internal level and in the 
external projection, a change in the present 
style of development would arouse obvious 
resistance on the part of the transnational cor-
porations, to judge by the way they have acted 
so far. 
At all events, in comparison with the Third 
World as a whole Latin America constitutes a 
semi-industrialized area which combines rela-
tively high levels of income and development 
with great potential. Obviously, such condi-
tions give the region particularly strong nego-
tiating power, and the well-known clear-
sightedness of the transnational corporations as 
regards the future could make it possible to use 
this bargaining power successfully in order to 
obtain better adaptation of foreign capital to 
regional interests and to safeguard a more 
independent form of development. 
